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Non-technical Summary 
 
Analyzing the link between market structure and market performance is of central importance 
in the field of industrial organization. The aim is to understand the role of market structure, 
i.e., the number of firms in a market, their sizes and the products they offer, in determining 
the extent of market competition and market performance. 
 
In particular, antitrust and regulatory authorities are interested in knowing how many firms it 
takes to sustain competition in a market. For example, the expected relation between the 
number of firms in the market and market outcomes such as prices or qualities is at the core of 
merger assessments. These questions are of central importance to society and to the 
consumers, because a minimum level of competition ensures both sufficient provision of the 
good and reasonable prices for the consumer. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the interaction between market structure and market performance 
in e-commerce for consumer electronics. We use data from Austria's largest online site for 
price comparisons combined with retail-data on whole sale prices provided by a major 
hardware producer. We observe firms' prices as well as their input prices, and all their moves 
in the entry and the pricing game. With this information we can analyze how sellers’ markups 
over the producer’s wholesale price react to the number of firms that compete in the market. 
We also look at the impact of market structure on market performance over the product life 
cycle, as other studies focusing on market structure find that entry has, especially at the 
beginning of the life cycle, a significant impact on prices.  
 
An important contribution of this paper stems from a novel way of dealing with the 
phenomenon that, it is extremely easy for e-commerce-shops, to add and remove items from 
their product portfolio. This makes the analysis very difficult, because usually the number of 
shops will be related to how attractive an item is to sell, and will thus depend on the variables 
we wish to explain. This situation is an example of the “endogeneity problem”, which can 
pose a threat to the validity of empirical estimates. We are dealing with this issue by using the 
information on how many shops typically listed earlier cameras at a particular stage of the 
life-cycle (in the past). This variable will capture overarching factors in the listing decision 
(e.g. distribution patterns), that cannot so easily be changed and is hence immune to such 
issues as whether an item is currently en vogue or not.  
 
We find a very short lifecycle of usually less than a year and a highly significant and strong 
effect of the number of firms on markups. Ten additional competitors in the market reduce the 
markup of the cheapest firm by more than 1.5 percentage points on average. We also find that 
this effect is strongest in the first month, but also in the end of the lifecycle. Interestingly, 
markups were found to be lowest in months 2-4, but at the same time, the number of firms 
seems to be less relevant to pushing down prices in that stage of the lifecycle. For the 
consumer this means that by waiting three more weeks she will get the same price reduction 
she would get by going to a market with one additional firm. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen der Struktur und der Funktionsfähigkeit eines 
Marktes ist eine der zentralen Fragen auf dem Gebiet der Industrieökonomie. Dabei gilt es zu 
verstehen, wie die Marktstruktur (also die Anzahl der Firmen im Markt, deren Marktanteil 
sowie die Anzahl, Qualität und Charakteristika ihrer Produkte) das Ausmaß des Wettbewerbs 
im Markt beeinflusst. 
 
Vor allem Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsbehörden wollen wissen wie viele Firmen nötig 
sind um den Wettbewerb in einem Markt aufrecht zu erhalten. Um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen, 
bei der Bewertung einer beabsichtigten Firmenfusion ist der zu erwartende Zusammenhang 
zwischen der Anzahl der Firmen im Markt und den Preisen oder der durchschnittlich 
angebotenen Qualität die zentrale Entscheidungsgrundlage. Diese Fragen sind folglich von 
hoher Relevanz für die Gesellschaft und die Endverbraucher, da ein Mindestniveau an 
Wettbewerb sowohl die Bereitstellung der Güter als auch transparente Preise sicherstellt. 
 
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir den Zusammenhang von Struktur und Funktionsfähigkeit 
von Märkten im Bereich des E-Commerce. Hierfür verwenden wir Daten der größten 
österreichischen Online-Preisvergleichsseite und Vertriebsdaten eines der größten Hersteller 
von Haushaltselektronik. Wir beobachten die Großhandelspreise, die Preise der Firmen und 
deren Inputpreise, sowie alle Aktionen der Einzelhändler (Markteintrittsentscheidungen und 
Preissetzung). Mit dieser Information sind wir in der Lage zu untersuchen, wie der Aufschlag 
auf den Großhandelspreis auf die Anzahl der Firmen im Markt reagiert. Darüber hinaus 
analysieren wir, wie sich der Zusammenhang von Marktstruktur und Funktionsfähigkeit über 
den Lebenszyklus der Produkte verändert, da die Marktstruktur, wie in früheren Studien 
gezeigt wurde, vor allem am Beginn des Lebenszyklus große Auswirkungen auf die Preise 
haben kann. 
 
Ein wesentlicher Beitrag dieser Arbeit liegt darin, explizit zu berücksichtigen, dass E-
Commerce Händler sehr einfach Produkte in ihr Sortiment aufnehmen und bald danach 
wieder aus dem Sortiment auslisten können. Dies erschwert eine objektive Analyse, da davon 
auszugehen ist, dass die Anzahl der Firmen von vielen stark variablen Faktoren abhängt. So 
können Händler beispielsweise darauf reagieren, wie stark ein Produkt in den Medien präsent 
ist oder wie seine Profitabilität variiert. Wir können dieses Problem lösen, indem wir auf die 
Information aus früheren Lebenszyklen zurückgreifen, um so zu erfahren, wie viele Händler 
ein Produkt in einer bestimmten Phase des Lebenszyklus „üblicherweise“ in ihr Sortiment 
aufnehmen. Diese Variable ist abhängig von langfristigen, zum Teil nicht beobachtbaren, 
Faktoren (wie zum Beispiel der Vertriebskette), die auf die Sortimentswahl einen Einfluss 
haben, aber nicht rasch geändert werden können nur weil ein Produkt gerade in Mode ist. 
 
Wir gelangen zum Ergebnis, dass der Lebenszyklus der untersuchten Produkte sehr kurz ist 
und dass ein starker negativer Zusammenhang zwischen der Anzahl der Firmen und der 
Preisaufschläge im Markt besteht. Zehn Firmen mehr im Markt senken den Preisaufschlag des 
Bestbieters um mehr als 1,5 Prozentpunkte. Außerdem finden wir, dass der Effekt im ersten 
Monat besonders stark ist, in den Monaten zwei bis vier etwas abflacht, um dann ab dem 
sechsten Monat wieder zuzunehmen. Gerade dieses letzte Ergebnis ist gewissermaßen 
überraschend. Für den Konsumenten bedeutet dies, dass er durch das Abwarten von 3 
Wochen dieselbe Preisreduktion erwarten kann wie wenn er einen Markt sucht, auf dem ein 
Händler mehr anbietet. 
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1 Introduction
Analyzing the link between market structure and market performance is of central importance
in the field of industrial organization. In particular, antitrust and regulatory authorities are
interested to know how many firms it takes to sustain competition in a market. For example,
the expected relation between the number of firms in the market and market outcomes such
as prices or qualities is at the core of merger assessments.
We investigate the interaction between market structure and market performance in e-
commerce using data from Austria's largest online site for price comparisons combined with
retail data on wholesale prices provided by a major hardware producer for consumer elec-
tronics. We observe firms' prices as well as their input prices, and all their moves in the
entry and the pricing game. To measure the rate at which oligopoly margins decline toward
zero, we analyze how quickly the break-even price-cost margins fall as the number of market
participants increases from one to two firms, two to three firms, and so on. We also look at
the impact of market structure on market performance over the product life cycle, as other
studies focusing on market structure find that entry has, especially at the beginning of the
life cycle, a significant impact on prices.1
The use of data from online markets has been pioneered by the studies of Brynjolfsson and
Smith (2000) and Baye et al. (2004) who used online data to study the relationship of prices
and competition on online markets. They also analyzed the distribution of prices and found
that price dispersion increases with the number of competitors. Since then, a large variety of
issues have been studied with online data. Baye et al. (2009) have examined the Kelkoo price
comparison site and noted that there is a big discontinuity in clicks at the top listed products,
a result which can be explained with clearinghouse models. Both, Ellison and Ellison (2005)
and Ellison and Ellison (2009) have examined the competition of Internet retailers and have
identified different internet-specific firm strategies which are applied in online markets to cope
with the increased price sensitivity of online markets.
The prime advantage of e-commerce is the easy availability of large amounts of data on
retail-prices at very little cost for the researcher. Moreover, it is generally possible to observe
all the prices and price changes of the firms and to reconstruct the sequence in which they
react to each other. More than that, it is possible to obtain data for many different markets,
be it books or consumer electronics. However, the researcher faces the disadvantage that he
does not always observe the entire market, but only a segment, and he usually cannot tell
whether a posted price has also induced a transaction or not.
Our point of departure is the study by Haynes and Thompson (2008b), which exploits data
on digital cameras. Their study, which is related to a similar study by Barron et al. (2004),
provides useful insights into the evolution of prices and price dispersion as a function of the
market structure. Underlining the potential of research on e-commerce data, the study uses
data for about 400 models of digital cameras in the US. It also takes first steps towards taking
the life cycle of consumer electronics into account, even though mostly by regarding life cycle
effects as a nuisance parameter. Moreover, the authors point to the problem of potentially
endogenous explanatory variables and emphasize the need of adequately incorporating seller
heterogeneities. They cannot do so, because they only observe the aggregate data that's
1Examples are Berry (1992), Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005), Carlton (1983), Davis (2006), Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Geroski (1989), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), and Toivanen and Waterson
(2000, 2005).
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publicly available. The present study proposes to expand on their analysis, by developing
an instrument for the number of sellers in a market and to focus on the determinants of the
product life cycle. Haynes and Thompson (2008a) use less detailed data to take a first step
towards explaining entry and exit behavior in a shopbot. To do so, they estimate an error-
correction model and show that the entry and exit into a market is correlated with a measure
of lagged price-cost-margin and the number of competitors. Also, in the marketing literature
Moe and Yang (2009) recently analyzed the product life cycle in e-tailing. However, like the
literature in IO, their data did not allow them to take the endogeneity of entry and exit into
account.
Our paper sheds light onto the question how market structure affects the functioning of a
market and the price level. Most importantly we are able to take a first step to circumventing
the usual difficulty instrumenting the number of competitors in a market. Clearly, even if
under potentially reversed signs, these questions are also of great interest to consumers and
manufacturers who wish to maximize their benefits. We find a highly significant and strong
effect of the number of firms on markups. Ten additional competitors in the market reduce
median markups by 0.22 percentage points and the minimum markup by 0.57 percentage
points. However, accounting for the potential endogeneity of markups and the number of
firms in the market, we see a substantially higher negative effect: ten additional retailers
reduce the markup of the median firm by 0.85 percentage points and the markup of the
cheapest firm by 1.72 percentage points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the theoretical predictions
in Section 2 and describe the data as well as the empirical strategy in 3. We discuss our
estimation results in Section 4 and conclude with Section 5.
2 Theoretical Predictions and Relationship of Interest
The point of departure for the present study is a series of two papers by Barron et al. (2004)
and Haynes and Thompson (2008b). Both confront the predictions of competing model with
data that relate the market structure to price level and price dispersion but both have to take
the number of competitors in a market as exogenously given, which they themselves point out
is possibly not warranted. In what follows we shall briefly summarize their discussions of the
differing predictions of the competing models to be tested.
Grossly speaking, we distinguish three groups of models which allow for price dispersion
and hence a violation of the law of one price: Firstly, search theoretic models (Varian (1980),
Rosenthal (1980)), which successfully allow price dispersion by introducing heterogeneity in
the search costs of consumers. Secondly, models of monopolistic competition (e.g.: Perloff and
Salop (1985)) can account for price dispersion, when extended by introducing asymmetries
across firms, such as heterogeneous producer cost or heterogeneous producer demand (cf.
Barron et al. (2004)). Thirdly, Carlson and McAfee (1983) present a search theoretic model
which accommodates two sources of heterogeneities by assuming a non-degenerate distribution
of producers' marginal cost and heterogeneous visiting cost of the consumers. Combining these
two types of heterogeneity results in somewhat different predictions about the behavior of price
and price-dispersion, given an increase in the number of competitors. Finally, also a simple
structure-conduct-performance model (Bain (1951)) can be tested in this context (although
with somewhat vaguer predictions), as was pointed out by Haynes and Thompson (2008b).
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While all these models differ significantly in their setup, they all have something to say
about the impact of market structure on prices and price dispersion. Hence evidence about
this relationship is important to test them and to tell which of them is most suitable to think
about a market at hand. For the present purposes it suffices to skip a detailed discussion and
merely provide a very brief overview over the different predictions of the models.2
The first group of search theoretic models (building on different consumer types, that are
equipped with different search costs (e.g. Varian (1980))), predicts that an increased number
of sellers results in a larger price dispersion and, somewhat against intuition, a higher average
price. The second group of models with differentiated sellers and either production cost or
buyer cost asymmetries would expect that a larger number of sellers is associated with a
lower average price and smaller price dispersion. Thirdly, the model by Carlson and McAfee
(1983) predicts that average prices would go down while price dispersion is expected to rise.
According to a structure-conduct-performance model where the incumbents face the threat of
entry, prices should decrease or stay equal when more firms enter the market, depending on
the strength of the entry-threat. The model is somewhat silent about price dispersion.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Price search engine: In our analysis we use data from the largest Austrian price comparison
site www.geizhals.at3. This platform is Austria's unchallenged market leader for comparing
prices quoted by retailers of consumer electronics. For the study in this paper we use daily
data on 70 items4 from a major hardware manufacturer5 which launched during the period
from January 2007 till December 20086. We define a camera's birth by it's appearance on
geizhals.at. The cameras were on offer at up to 212 sellers from Austria and Germany.
Available Data: For time t (measured in days) we observe for each product i and retailer j
the priceijt, the shipping costijt posted at the website
7 and the availabilityijt of the product
8.
Additionally, we observe the customers' referral request (clicksijt) from the geizhals.at website
to the retailers' e-commerce website as proxy for the consumers' demand. Customers have the
possibility to evaluate the (service)quality of the firms on a 5-point scale the average of which
is listed together with the price information on geizhals.at. Wholesale prices for each product
i at time t were obtained from the Austrian representative of the international manufacturer.
We do not claim, that these wholesale prices correspond perfectly to the retailers' marginal
2For a more detailed discussion of the models the interested reader is referred to the two papers by Barron
et al. (2004) and Haynes and Thompson (2008b) our work builds on or to the original papers. Their discussion
is clever, concise and insightful, but repeating it here would not add any further insights.
3Based on this data set Dulleck et al. (2011) analyze the search and purchasing behavior of buyers in which
the reliability of the retailer gets more important the closer it comes to actual buying decisions.
4digital single lens reflex cameras (DSLR), single lens reflex cameras (SLR) and laser printers
5The hardware manufacturer is a multinational corporation specialized in manufacturing of electronic equip-
ment in several areas. The manufacturer asked to keep his name anonymous. If somebody wants to check the
validity of our results we can offer more detailed information on the manufacturer.
6For our instrumentation strategy we will use also the product life cycle of cameras entering the market
starting from May 2006.
7Shipping cost is the only variable which has to be parsed from a text field. We use the information on
cash in advance for shipping to Germany, which is the type of shipping cost most widely quoted by the shops.
Missing shipping cost are imputed with the mean shipping cost by the other retailers.
8If the product is available immediately or at short notice the dummy is 1, if the product is available only
within 2-4 days it is 0.
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cost. Even though the manufacturer's distribution policy indicates that the retailers should
be served by the local representative it may happen, that single retailers procure commodities
for instance from the Asian market. Moreover, the local representative might offer special
promotions including lower wholesale prices in exceptional cases (e.g. if a retailer commits
to promote the manufacturers good in a special way). Finally, it has to be mentioned that
besides the wholesale price the retailers in e-commerce might have additional cost each time
they order. Despite the fact that we cannot be entirely sure that each and every e-commerce
retailer is always ordering at the wholesale prices we were provided with, they are a very good
proxy for the actual marginal cost the retailers' are confronted with9. Priceijt and wholesale
priceit were used to calculate the firms' markupijt (using the Lerner index) and the markets'
price dispersionit.
Organization of data: We reorganized the data in a way so that the product life cycles
of all digicams start at the same day 1. Hence, we have shifted the product life cycles of
the digicams so that we can analyze the impact of market structure on markup and price
dispersion in a cross section of 70 product life cycles. This reorganization of data is also
important to guarantee that observations are iid. Especially the independence assumption is
crucial as listing decisions of e-commerce traders are strategic variables: If we studied product
cycles in real time the decision to list digicam X might be related to the listing decision of
the follower model Y. By shifting the product life cycles to identical starting points the iid
assumption concerning our data structure is valid. We define the end of a product life cycle if
the amount of referral requests diminish to less than 500 remaining clicks. Finally, we collapse
the data in order to create a panel with products as units of observation and thus obtain a
daily unbalanced panel with information on the products' age, the number of firms, average
markups, markup of the price leader, different measures for price-dispersion, and the number
of clicks.
Descriptives: Table 1 contains summary statistics of the collapsed two-dimensional panel-
data. Each observation in the descriptives refer to a single product i at a given day t in
the product life cycle. We will use the markup (=Lerner Index) and the price dispersion as
endogenous variables. Whereas the median markup amounts to 17.8% on average, the mean
markup for price leaders is only 4.6 %. These numbers are of comparable size as in Ellison and
Snyder (2011), who report an average markup of 4% for memory modules on Pricewatch.com.
We use different measures for the price dispersion: the coefficient of variation and the standard
deviation of the distribution of prices, as well as the absolute price gap between the price leader
and the second cheapest price. The absolute price gap varies between 0 and 515.9 Euro with
a mean of 11 Euro. On average a product life cycle amounts to 166.7 days with a mean of
104.3 firms which are offering the digicams. Visual inspection of the data (see Figure 2) shows
that the estimated markup declines with age, and, more importantly, as the number of firms
increases (each observation again corresponds to the data of a single product i at a given
day t). However, this pattern is by no means very abrupt, as one might expect in perfectly
transparent e-commerce markets. We rather observe a well positive average markup, also
with 70 and more firms in the market. In the top left panel, the median markupit is scattered
against the number of firmsit in the corresponding market and the top right panel shows
the average. The number of firms ranges from 0 to slightly more than 200 and the median
9According to the Austrian distributor the Austrian and German list of wholesale prices are almost identical.
Note the manufacturer's incentive to keep cross-border sales between distributors and retailers as low as possible
if the manufacturer were to pursue substantial price discrimination between countries.
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markup ranges from 0% to 35.2%. It must be noted that we also observe negative markups
especially for the minimum price firms - the average markup of price leaders is 4.8% with
a standard deviation of 7.9%. In our dataset we observe for 26.92 % of all best price offers
negative markups. This is in line with Ellison and Snyder (2011) who report also a substantial
amount of price offers with negative markups for Pricewatch.com. Negative markups might
have several possible causes: They might simply point to sell-outs after overstocking, it might
be a hint to cases where retailers are not procuring via the official retail channels but exploit
price differentials with, for instance, Asian markets. Finally, loss leader strategies might be
responsible for negative markups where a digicam is offered at a price below marginal cost in
order to attract new customers or to make profits with complementary goods. In the middle
row the median mark-up is plotted against the age of the product. Again the markets' median
markups fall on average with the duration of the product life cycle. If the product is available
the retailer has the incentive to raise the price to the rivals's level. In the lower row, the
median markup is plotted against the age of the camera (in months). We typically observe
a camera between 7-8 and 15 months. While the line for the averages looks very smooth,
the scatter plots on the left of the graphs reveal however, that there is large heterogeneity.
Apparently there are three types of digicams: Some appear to be listed by fewer shops (20
and 60, respectively) and then to be taken off the market sooner, whereas another group of
cameras seems to be listed by roughly 150 shops on average and then to be taken off the
market only after 14 months. The apparent segregation of markets is striking. As expected
we observe rather fast market entry within the first two months - after that the amount of
firms stagnates. Summarizing the descriptive results it can be stated that markup declines
very slowly, given that firms have to compete in prices in this market. Secondly, the life cycle
of digital products is short enough to not only allow observing their entire lifecycle, but also
observe many thereof, which is the feature our instrumentation strategy shall build on.
Empirical Strategy: In order to estimate the impact of market structure on markups and
price dispersion, we estimate the following fixed-effects regression as our baseline model:
markup = αj + α1 ∗ age+ α2 ∗ age2 + β1 ∗ numfirms+ β2 ∗ (numfirms)2 + jt
Dependent variables depvars are the minimum markup, price dispersion (measured as the
coefficient of variation) and the markup of the median-price and we regress each of them
separately on the number of firms in the market that day. Moreover, we include a quadratic
age-trend and thus measure life-cycle effects as a byproduct.10 However, before we can do
so we have to account for the fact, that it is very easy to list and unlist an item. Hence the
number of sellers can react extremely fast on the market characteristics like markups or price
dispersion.
Sources of Endogeneity : In all markets - but in particular in an e-tailing shopbot market
- it is important to treat market structure as endogenous: due to simple and low-cost market
entry and exit, e-tailers can easily adapt to changing circumstances by listing a particular
product.
Generally, we are worried about two sources of potential endogeneitiy: i.) heterogeneity of
the cameras in the market (quality, design-features etc.) and ii.) the shops' ability to quickly
react to rising or falling markups of to be earned with a specific model by simply moving in
10In all the estimations we included month dummies to account for seasonality effects.
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and out of the respective markets. Since our design is based on fixed effects estimation, we are
less concerned about the heterogeneity of products. However, we still have to worry about the
second source of endogeneity, which is due to the simultaneous determination of the markups
and the number of firms.
If, for example, some unobserved factor temporarily drives up markups for some item,
shops which did not sell the item before, might move into this market. Thus, we would expect
to observe more shops in markets where higher markups can be reaped and vice verca. This,
in turn, might result in the econometrician estimating a less negative relationship of interest
than actually appropriate. This is easily illustrated by looking at the system in which markups
and the number of firms are simultaneously determined, and where we are interested in the
first of the following two relationships.11
(1) markupjt = δj + α1 ∗ numfirmjt + β1Z1 + ε1,jt
(2) numfirmjt = γj + α2 ∗markupjt + β2Z2 + ε2,jt
Substitution of the second into the first equation and rearranging, gives the reduced form
for the number of firms:
(3) numfirmjt = pij + pi21Z1 + pi22Z2 + ujt
with φ := 11−α2α1 , pij = φ(γj + α2δj), pi21 = φα2β1, pi22 = φβ2 and finally ujt = φ(α2ε1 + ε2).
In equation (1) the issue is whether numfirmjt and ε1,jt might be correlated due to
simultaneity (z1 and ε1 are by assumption uncorrelated). Yet, from equation (3), it is easy
to see, that Cov(numfirmjt,ε1,jt) is typically not 0, since ujt is a linear function of ε1,jt.
Unless α2 = 0, this tells us that estimation of equation (1) by OLS will result in biased and
inconsistent estimates of the α1 and β1. More precisely we have:
(4) Cov(numfirmjt, ε1,jt) =
α2
1− α2α1 ∗ V ar(ε1)
and hence regressing markup on numfirm will return the biased estimate:
α̂1,OLS = α1 +
Cov(numfirmjt, ε1,jt)
V ar(numfirmjt)
= α1 +
α2
1− α2α1 ∗
V ar(ε1)
V ar(numfirmjt)
Closer examination of this result reveals, that the bias α21−α2α1 ∗
V ar(ε1)
V ar(numfirmjt)
is positive,
whenever α2 > 0 (more firms enter, when markups are high) and α1 < 0 (markups decrease
when the number of firms increases). Therefore, if these conditions are satisfied, we would
expect an upward bias of the OLS-coefficient of numfirm.
11Note that in the illustration we only look at a linear regressor to be instrumented and neglect the quadratic
term. This corresponds to the estimations we show in Columns (1) and (2) of tables 3 and 4.
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Instrumentation strategy: In order to cope with this endogeneity problem we follow an
IV-approach and instrument the number of firms. For that purpose we exploit the fact that
in the full Geizhals.at data, we observe the complete lifecycle of many products of the same
producer and that they were launched in different points in time. For markets with brand
names a part of the listing decisions can be explained by common patterns, such as established
supply-relationship shops might have with a producer or a wholesale importer, or variations
in the availability. These patterns remain the same over time and they are not influenced by
contemporary fluctuations on a specific camera. We exploit this fact in order to devise an
instrument for the number of firms, based on the shops' behavior in the markets of previously
introduced products. In other words, we use the timing of listing decisions of e-tailers for
brand products of our manufacturer in the past as an instrument for current listing decisions.
Clearly, such past decisions - in particular if they come from different markets (e.g. digital
cameras versus computer products) will be relevant predictors of the listing decisions today.
On the other hand, the instrument is based on the exclusion restriction, that the shops, when
taking their listing decisions in the past, did not take into consideration the current, then
future, digital cameras.
The instrumentation strategy is illustrated with an example in Figure 1, which represents
an e-tailer, which we shall call 0815 for the sake of illustration, and its listing decisions over
time: let us consider whether shop 0815 will list a product F , on the 10th day after intro-
duction. This decision is represented by the encircled red line on item F . We predict the
probability of this event by the shop 0815's general probability of listing a similar item that
has been on the market for 10 days. Considering only the items that saw light before product
F was introduced we first fix the number of such items we wish to consider (to three, here).
Then we can calculate how many of those items, were listed by shop 0815 on the tenth day
after they appeared and taking the share gives us a readily available estimate of shop 0815's
probability to list product F on its 10th day of existence.
This method can easily be extended to the first, second, third, twentieth, etc. day. Thus,
simply calculating the share of products listed on a given day in earlier life cycles, we obtain
an estimate of shop 0815's probability to list an item (F ) on it's first, second, tenth, etc.
day of existence. Thus, repeating the exercise in order to predict what shop 0815 will do
with Camera D on the third day (highlighted by the green encircled dash), we look at the
"average decision" for products A, B, and C on the third day. Note, that we ignore F and its
predecessors when instrumenting D, because they were introduced after D. Also note, that
for instrumenting F we ignored A - D, because we had decided that those cameras lay too far
in the past of F .12 In a last step, we aggregate these probabilities across shops to obtain the
predictor of the number of shops that will offer item F on a given day. 13
12N.B.: When calculating the instrument, we fixed the number of earlier cameras to 3. This number can
be varied by the researcher, depending on how fine grained the instrument needs to be and the number of
available products. As fixing the number of cameras to three resulted in a reasonably strong instrument, we
favored this specification over one, where we have fewer data available in the estimation. However, we also
tried an alternative specification with 5 cameras, which resulted in very similar estimates. Moreover, rather
than fixing the number of cameras, the researcher might prefer to fix a time-period (e.g. 6 months before F
was introduced) and include all cameras that saw light during that period. The latter way of framing the
instrumentation strategy does not ensure however, that the same number of products is used for calculating
the shares needed for the instrument. Therefore to obtain valid standard errors additional bootstrapping -
methods will be needed.
13Note that the method we suggest can be used even if only market-level data are available, simply by taking
the average of the number of firms that listed the earlier product on the given day.
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Figure 1: Instrument uses firm's listing behavior in earlier lifecycles
time
Camera A
Camera B
Camera C
Camera D
Camera F
3 Observations
Notes: If we want to predict how many shops will list a product on any given day q after introduction we use a
shop's general probability of listing one of the three items that entered the market before product j, q days after they
were introduced. Examples: To predict listing behavior for Camera D on day 3 (encircled green dash), we would use
information on Cameras A, B, and C on their respective third days of existence (highlighted green dashes). However,
we would not use the information from the Cameras that saw light after D (illustrated by a black dash on day 3). Now,
to predict how many shops listed camera F on day 10 (encircled red dash), we would use the information only from the
cameras that saw light later than (excluding) Camera D, provided they entered the market before F (highlighted red
dashes). Cameras A, B, C (black dash on day 10) and also models younger than camera F would be ignored for the
computations relevant to Camera F .
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First-stage regressions: As we use the time patterns of previous listing decisions in com-
pletely different markets our instrument should not have a direct causal implication on today's
markups and price dispersion. Table 2 presents the first stage regressions and show that the
instrument is strong enough to explain the markets actual entry decisions depicted by the
number of firms at each point in time of the product life cycles. Columns (1) and (2) compare
the contribution of the instrument to explaining the number of firms, and columns (3) and (4)
show the contribution to its quadratic term. It is easy to see that the instrumental variables
of interest are significantly different from 0 with a probability of more than 99.99%. Moreover
they improve the predictive value of the model. The R2 in the baseline regression without the
instrumented number of firms (not shown in table) amounts to 0.434. Adding our instrument
for the number of firms raises the R2 by 0.0111 in column (1) from 0.434 to 0.446. For the
other columns even higher marginal R2 are computed. We also computed the F-statistics to
test the null-hypothesis that the excluded instruments are irrelevant in the first-stage and they
exceed the critical value of 10 substantially. With F-values well above 300 we can prove that
our instruments are strong enough to explain the variation in the number of firms over the
lifecycle. For the following analysis we use columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 to calculate the
predicted number of firms for the second stage regressions.
4 Results
4.1 Market Structure and Market Performance
Tables 3 and 4 show our basic results for the impact of market structure on markups. These
baseline specifications are parsimoniuous, as they consider only the number of firms on the
market - either linearly or in quadratic terms - and the product life cycle. Moreover, to account
for seasonal effects, we add an indicator variable for offers that were quoted in December14.
All product-specific influences are covered by a product fixed-effect. Columns 1 and 3 show
OLS estimations, whereas in Columns 2 and 4, our instrumental variables approach is used.
Our results indicate a highly significant and relatively strong effect of the number of firms
on markups. Not accounting for the endogeneity of the number of firms and using OLS,
we would estimate the effect of ten additional competitors in the market to reduce median
markups by 0.22 and minimummarkup by 0.57 percentage points. The reaction of the cheapest
firm is significantly higher as compared to the reaction of the median firm, which might be
explained by the high frequency with which prices are changed in online markets, where the
cheapest price is a focus of considerable attention of both consumers and firms.
If we instrument for the number of firms, we see a substantially larger negative effect: 10
additional retailers reduce the markup of the cheapest firm by 1.72 percentage points and the
markup of the median firm by 0.85 percentage points. These figures are large in economic
terms considering the standard deviation of the number of firms in our sample - 57 firms. As
was discussed above, OLS is likely to underestimate the true effect of an additional firm on
the markup, as it does not account for the fact that attractive items also attract more firms.
Again, the reaction of the cheapest firm is considerably higher as compared to the median
firm.
In Columns 3 and 4 we use a quadratic specification of the number of firms: it turns out
14The results for this variable are omitted in the tables to follow.
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that there is a solid negative - but decreasingly negative - influence of the number of retailers
on markup, both for the cheapest as well as the median markup. Numerically, for the cheapest
price, the negative influence of the number of firms ceases at 560, for the median markup with
340 firms. As the maximum number of firms in our sample is 203, we can safely assume that
for most part of our sample, this negative relationship is a valid description. Also note that,
while the median markup remains positive throughout, the minimum markup falls below 0
for very large numbers of sellers.
Looking at the impact of the product cycle on markups, the picture is not entirely clear:
in all 2SLS regressions markups grow in the beginning and go down after the first few months
until the end of the product life cycle. For the minimum markup the turning point is between
five and six months (Columns 2 and 4 of Tables 3 and 4) which is around the mean duration
of a product life cycle of 5.5 months. For the median markup the turning point is with eight
to nine months slightly above the mean duration of the product life cycle.
To investigate the impact of the number of sellers on price dispersion we concentrate on
the coefficient of variation (Table 5). While the OLS regressions show a somewhat negative
relation between the number of firms and price dispersion, in the 2SLS results in Columns
2 and 4, we see a strong positive relationship. In the linear case, increasing the number of
firms by 10 increases the coefficient of variation by 0.03. The situation is quite similar in the
quadratic case (Column 4): up to a level of 120, increasing the number of firms always leads
to higher price dispersion and also after that, though declining, it remains large beyond the
level of 200 firms.
The combined results on markups and price dispersion are compatible with the model
(Carlson and McAfee, 1983), i.e. a search theoretic model which accommodates two sources
of heterogeneities by assuming a non-degenerate distribution of producers' marginal cost and
heterogeneous visiting cost of the consumers. The other search theoretic models are not in
line with our findings of a decreasing median markup. Models of monopolistic competition,
on the other hand, predict a decreasing price dispersion, which contradicts with our findings
about the coefficient of variation.
In Table 6 we present the effect of the market structure on shipping cost. The patterns are
largely the same as in Tables 3 and 4. While OLS predicts a positive relationship of shipping
cost and the number of firms, Columns 2 and 4 reveal a robust negative relationship with an
insignificantly small quadratic term. Ten more firms actually decrease the average shipping
cost in that market by 7 cent, again a large number bearing in mind the standard deviation
of 57 firms.
4.2 Lifecycle Effects
In this section we investigate, whether the profit-squeezing effect of a higher number of firms
is the same in different phases of the product life cycle. To do this, we extend the model to
check for different effects of market structure on markups over the product cycle.
In Table 7 we estimate the baseline model and add crossterms, interacting the number of
firms with age (both linearly and quadratically). For ease of interpretation of the coefficients,
in Figures 3 and 4 we also plotted how markups are predicted to depend on the number of
firms, separately for different stages of the product life cycle.
In these plots, each line represents a product of certain age and we plotted the curve
for products right after their introduction, and after 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9 months in the market,
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respectively. To make the picture clearer, we concentrate for each phase of the life cycle on
the typical situation concerning the number of firms.15 Interestingly, our plots show a very
consistent pattern, which appears to consist of three phases. In Figure 3 we see the pattern
for minimum markups. Apart from the months in the middle, we see a clear pattern: markups
decline with more firms. This pattern, however, is less pronounced during months 2 - 4 where
we observe a movement to the right, with more firms entering while markups remain stable.
The estimated curves for those months resembles a J shape, indicating a small negative effect.
Only towards the end of the cycle (month 6 and later) competitive pressures become more
pronounced and the relationship becomes clearly negative again.
Comparing the 6 curves, we can look at how markups develop over time: First markups
fall drastically, but then they stabilize and even slightly recover. Figure 3 shows the minimum
markup remaining which decreases below 0 within 2 months. However, after that it remains
close to 0 with more or less fierce competition, depending on the lifecycle phase. For the
case of median markups in Figure 4, we can see a fairly similar pattern: More firms in the
market means lower median markup, particularly in the beginning and towards the end of the
lifecycle. Again, there is an initial reduction of markups over the time of the life cycle, but
this trend turns around after three months and then the median markups even slightly rise
again.
4.3 Robustness
Several robustness checks were performed and we shall present them in what follows. First, we
test the robustness of the basic results by using varying definitions of price dispersion and by
using other definitions of markups, i.e. by including shipping costs into sales prices. Moreover,
at the end we take account of the fact that some of the price offers attract less attention of
potential buyers; we use click-weighted markups to control for this.
Our first robustness check in Table 8 concerns our definition of price dispersion. We ex-
periment with different definitions: apart from the coefficient of variation we use the standard
deviation of prices and a coefficient of variation calculated in such a way, that the prices are
weighted with the number of clicks they received. All these variations show a similar pattern:
increasing number of firms is first increasing, then slightly reducing price dispersion; in all
cases, the turning point is above the average number of firms in the sample. Interestingly,
applying the click-weighting increases the turning point even further, to 175 firms.
The next robustness check in Table 9 concerns the measurement of prices. Consumers
typically pay the product price plus shipping costs. It is well-known that firms can follow
specific price-setting strategies to set visible prices - the product price - very low and non-
visible prices, like shipping costs, etc. relatively high (see Ellison and Ellison (2009)). In such
a case, the total price including shipping costs should be used to calculate the markup of
the firm. Unfortunately, we do not know "actual" shipping costs of the firms, therefore, we
calculate an artificial markup: product price plus announced shipping costs minus wholesale
price. As there are different shipping costs possible, we concentrate on those, which are mostly
observed in the data, which are shipping costs to Germany when paying cash in advance. If
firms can vary their announced shipping costs, they should also react to the market structure;
i.e. the number of firms in the market. In Table 8 we show that, in fact, our qualitative results
15We plot only in the region between the 33rd and 67th percentile of the distribution concerning firm sizes
to avoid extrapolation of the polynomials.
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are fairly similar, just more pronounced: both minimum and median markup decline with the
number of firms and price dispersion is increasing.
We investigate further whether our results are influenced by the fact we treat all prod-
uct offers symmetrically in our regressions. In particular, in questions of price dispersion
researchers mistrust typically price offers which are way too high (cf. Baye et al. (2004)).
This suggests to weigh price offers with the number of clicks they are receiving in order to
give the low ranked - and maybe less reliable - price offers less weight.16 When we do this in
Table 10, we see our main results unchanged or reinforced.
Finally, we wanted to see whether our results are due to changes in the composition of the
shops offering an item over the life cycle. Particularly the presence of larger shops or of shops
who sell not only on geizhals.at, but also dispose of a brick and mortar outlet might affect the
outcomes in our estimation. Therefore in Tables 11 - 13 we include the composition of shops
in the regression. In these tables, Column 1 shows the quadratic 2SLS estimation from Tables
3, 4 and 6. We then add the share of firms that have the item stocked, the share of firms with
low reputation, the share of low-price firms, the share of large firms and the share of shops
with a brick and mortar facility. All of these shares are scaled on a range from 0 to 100, i.e.
if in Table 11 the share of large firms increases by ten percent, this is associated with a drop
in median markups by 0.62 percentage points.
First of all it should be noted, that the pattern that we observed in the baseline-specification,
is unaffected by taking into account several measures of shop composition. There is some rel-
atively small variation in the size of the coefficients and for shipping costs some effects are no
longer significant when controlling for the composition of shops. Yet, grosso modo the patterns
remain largely unaffected. Secondly also the estimated coefficients for the shop composition's
impact on the markups are of some interest. In all the tables, markups and shipping cost fall
as the share of larger firms (Column 5) and the share of firms with low reputation (Column 3)
increases. The decrease of markups is more pronounced for the size of the firms. The pattern
is somewhat ambiguous for the share of low price firms (Column 4). While a higher share
of low price firms slightly decreases median markups and shipping cost, the estimation for
the minimum markup appears to indicate otherwise. Even though accompanied by a greater
coefficient for the effect of the number of firms the coefficient for the share of low-price firms
is positive, which is somewhat counterintuitive. Finally, the share of firms which have the
item on stock (Column 2) and the share of firms which also have a brick and mortar facility
(Column 6) is related to an increase in both markups and shipping cost.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the effect of market structure on market performance in e-commerce.
As endogeneity of market structure and market performance might be an issue, we use the
behavior of sellers in high frequency product life cycles to develop an instrumental variable for
the number of firms in a market. To analyze the effect of market structure, we use data on 70
different digital cameras and find that an increase in the number of sellers in a market by 10
reduces the mark up of the price-leader by 1.72 percentage points and that of the median firm
by 0.85 percentage points. While we also find negative correlations between market structure
and performance using OLS regressions, we show, that these coefficients are likely to be biased
16Note that the third column of this table is the same as in Table 8 as it was relevant to both questions.
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upwards, due to simultaneity. To correct for this problem we propose an instrumental variable
strategy, which is based on regularities in listing behavior over the product life cycle. Indeed,
our results, which allow for a causal interpretation, are stronger. Moreover, we find a positive
effect of the number of firms on the coefficient of variation of prices.
When we differentiate market structure effects over the full life cycle of a product, we find
a negative impact especially in the beginning and the late phases of the life cycle. Moreover,
we find somewhat diminished effects in the stage that corresponds to an age of 2-4 months.
Our results refer to e-tailing in the presence of a price-search engine with very narrowly defined
products. In such a situation, consumers can very easily collect information about prices and
reliability of the sellers. Still, it takes a large number of sellers and a relatively long time until
markups of firms dissipate.
The markup of the price-leader diminishes as well over the life cycle of the product. If we
evaluate our results at sample means we can compare the competitive effect of more firms to
the effect of time: having one more firm in the market reduces the mark up of the price leader
by the same amount as three additional weeks in the product life cycle. In other words: By
waiting three more weeks a consumer will get the same price reduction she would get if she
went to a market with one additional firm.
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Table 3: Minimum markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 -0.5729*** -1.7157*** -0.9611*** -1.7876***
(0.012) (0.109) (0.030) (0.132)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0219*** 0.0160**
(0.002) (0.008)
age (months) -1.2275*** 1.3248*** -1.2477*** 0.8375***
(0.044) (0.247) (0.044) (0.138)
age2 0.0323*** -0.1193*** 0.0355*** -0.0889***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.009)
constant 16.1911*** 20.6920*** 17.0929*** 20.5172***
(0.108) (0.446) (0.126) (0.352)
observations 15,893 15,893 15,893 15,893
R2 0.495 0.501
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent Variable: Minimum
markup. The table shows the results form the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the
estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental
variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 4: Median markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 -0.2220*** -0.8476*** -0.6656*** -0.9078***
(0.007) (0.063) (0.018) (0.075)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0251*** 0.0134***
(0.001) (0.004)
age (months) -0.1890*** 1.2080*** -0.2120*** 0.8002***
(0.026) (0.144) (0.026) (0.078)
age2 0.0065*** -0.0765*** 0.0102*** -0.0510***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005)
constant 20.8724*** 23.3361*** 21.9029*** 23.1899***
(0.065) (0.259) (0.074) (0.199)
observations 15,893 15,893 15,893 15,893
R2 0.145 0.182
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent Variable: Median
markup. The table shows the results form the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the
estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental
variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 5: Coefficient of Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 -0.0034*** 0.0303*** -0.0030** 0.0445***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
(# of firms/10)2 -0.0000 -0.0021***
(0.000) (0.000)
age (months) -0.0022 -0.0780*** -0.0022 -0.0238***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
age2 0.0001 0.0046*** 0.0001 0.0012***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.1292*** -0.0034 0.1282*** -0.0032
(0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.014)
observations 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801
R2 0.008 0.008
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent Variable: Coefficient
of Variation. The table shows the results form the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the
estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental
variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 6: Shipping Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 0.0602*** -0.0708** 0.0446*** -0.0765**
(0.003) (0.029) (0.009) (0.039)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0008* 0.0010
(0.000) (0.002)
age (months) -0.1399*** 0.1248** -0.1413*** 0.0992***
(0.012) (0.060) (0.012) (0.035)
age2 0.0025*** -0.0132*** 0.0027*** -0.0115***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
constant 7.7592*** 8.3759*** 7.8029*** 8.3693***
(0.032) (0.140) (0.040) (0.129)
observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441
R2 0.075 0.075
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent Variable: Shipping Cost.
The table shows the results form the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the estimates from
the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental variable to
account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 9: Markup and price dispersion including shipping costs
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES min markup (de) med markup (de) coeff. of variation (de)
# of firms/10 -2.3518*** -1.4160*** 0.0554***
(0.143) (0.111) (0.006)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0407*** 0.0280*** -0.0020***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.000)
age (months) 0.9331*** 1.3266*** -0.0413***
(0.150) (0.116) (0.005)
age2 -0.0827*** -0.0825*** 0.0023***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.000)
constant 25.4791*** 26.5884*** -0.0865***
(0.474) (0.366) (0.024)
observations 15,511 15,511 15,186
products included 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The table shows the estimation results when
computing markups and price dispersion based on gross prices (total of price + shipping cost). For computing gross
prices we used the cost of shipping to Germany, that was charged for cash-in-advance payment. Fixed-effects 2SLS
panel regressions, using the instrumental variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms. The dependent
variables are displayed in the column heading. min markup (de) stands for minimum gross markup for shipping to
Germany.
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Figure 2: Median markup plotted against the number of firms and age of product.
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Notes: The plot shows the empirically observed distributions of number of firms, age and median markup
plotted against each other. In the top left panel, the median markupit is scattered against the number of
firmsit in the corresponding market and the right Column shows the corresponding averages. In the middle
row the median markup is plotted against the age of the product. In the lower row, the number of firms is
plotted against the age of the cameras (in months).
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Figure 3: Minimum markup in different phases of the product life cycle
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Notes: The plot shows the curve estimated in table 7. Each curve shows the estimated relationship of
number of firms and markup at a different point in time (right after introduction and after 1,2,3,6 and 9
months). The curves are plotted on the range from the 33rd to 67th percentile of the empirically observed
distribution of the number of firms at the point in time it corresponds to.
31
Figure 4: Median markup in different phases of the product life cycle
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Notes: The plot shows the curve estimated in table 7. Each curve shows the estimated relationship of
number of firms and markup at a different point in time (right after introduction and after 1,2,3,6 and 9
months). The curves are plotted on the range from the 33rd to 67th percentile of the empirically observed
distribution of the number of firms at the point in time it corresponds to.
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